Abstract. We apply the algebraic attacks on stream ciphers with memories to the summation generator. For a summation generator that uses n LFSRs, an algebraic equation relating the key stream bits and LFSR output bits can be made to be of degree less than or equal to 2 log 2 n , using log 2 n + 1 consecutive key stream bits. This is much lower than the upper bound given by previous general results. We also show that the techniques of [5] can be applied to summation generators using 2 k LFSRs to reduce the effective degree of the algebraic equation.
Introduction
Among recent developments on stream ciphers, the algebraic attack has gathered much attention. In this attack, an algebraic equation relating the initial key bits and the output key stream bits is set up and solved through linearization techniques.
Algebraic attack was first applied to block ciphers and public key cryptosystems [7, 2] . And its first successful application to stream cipher was done on Toyocrypt [3] . As the method was soon extended to LILI-128 [6] , it gathered much attention. Stream ciphers that utilize memory were first thought to be much more resistant to these attacks, but soon it was shown that even these cases were subject to algebraic attacks [1, 4] .
The summation generator proposed by Ruepel [10] is a nonlinear combiner with memory. It is known that the generator produces sequences whose period and correlation immunity are maximum, and whose linear complexity is conjectured to be close to the period. Hence it serves as a good building block for stream ciphers.
However, a correlation attack on the summation generator that uses two LFSRs was presented in [9] , even though it is also stated in [9] that this attack is not plausible if there are more than two LFSRs in use. Another well known attack on summation generator is given by [8] and points in the opposite direction. It uses FCSRs to simulate the summation generator and indicates that for a fixed initial key size, breaking them into too many LFSRs will add to its weakness.
In this work, we study the summation generator with the algebraic attack in mind. We show that for a summation generator that uses n LFSRs, an algebraic equation relating the key stream bits and LFSR output bits can be made to be of degree less than or equal to 2 log 2 n , using log 2 n + 1 consecutive key stream bits. This is much lower than the upper bound on the degree of algebraic equations that is guaranteed by the general works [1, 4] . We also show that the techniques of [5] can be applied to summation generators using 2 k LFSRs to reduce the effective degree of the equation further.
The impatient reader may confer to Tables 3 and 4 , appearing in later sections, for a quick look on the improvements we have given to understanding the actual strength of algebraic attacks on summation generators. Actually, Table 3 should be a good reference in view of algebraic attacks for anyone considering the use of a summation generator.
Summation generators and symmetric polynomials
We consider a summation generator that uses n binary LFSRs. The output of the j-th LFSR at time t will be denoted by x t j . Since we are dealing with binary values, we will not be using powers of these terms, hence the superscript t should not cause any confusion. The current carry value from the previous stage is denoted by c t . Note that the carry can be expressed in k = log 2 n bits. We shall let The binary output z t and the carry value for the next stage from the summation generator is given by
Let us denote by S t i , the i-th elementary symmetric polynomial in the variables {x t 1 , . . . , x t n }. We view them as boolean functions rather than as polynomials. Explicitly, they are
We shall also call these by the name elementary symmetric boolean functions.
For each 0 ≤ a, b ≤ n, let m a,b denote the value of S t a under the condition j x t j = b. This condition states that b of the n variable x t j are equal to 1 and that the others are equal to 0. Since S t a is symmetric, it makes sense to evaluate S t a under this condition. It is also clear that the values (m a,b ) n b=0 completely determines the value of S t a at an arbitrary input. To calculate m a,b , one has only to count how many of the monomials contained in S t a is nonzero. Hence we have
Now, consider the (n + 1) × (n + 1) matrix M = (m a,b ). The n = 4 case is given in Table 1 , as an example. Denote by M , the n × n matrix obtained by removing the last row and column from M . When we want to make explicit the number of variable used in defining M and M , we shall write M (n) and M (n). Lemma 1. For powers of 2, the matrix M satisfies
Proof. Let us first divide M into four parts and write
It is clear from (3) that the second quadrant, part II, is M (2 k ), as claimed. The equation also shows that the lower triangular part of M is zero. Hence the third quadrant is filled with zero, as claimed. We now show that I, II, and IV are identical. Once more, referring to (3), it suffices to show
for all 0 ≤ a, b < 2 k . To this end, we may easily check that
The coefficient of x a that would appear in the expansion of the left hand side (1 + x) 2 k +b is the middle term of (4). Since a < 2 k , the x a term in the right hand side may appear only in (1 + x) b and is equal to the first term of (4). This shows the first equality. Similarly, comparison of the coefficients of x 2 k +a shows the equality between the first and the last terms of (4). This completes the proof.
This lemma allows one to write the matrix M (2 k ) explicitly for any given k. Then, owing to (3), the matrix M (n) for any n may be obtained as a submatrix of a big enough M (2 k ). For example, Table 1 is a submatrix of M (8).
The basic theory on symmetric polynomials tells us that the set consisting of products of elementary symmetric polynomials forms a basis for the space of symmetric polynomials. In case of symmetric boolean functions, the following lemma can easily be seen to be true.
Lemma 2. Any boolean function that is symmetric in its variables, may be written as a linear combination of the elementary symmetric boolean functions.
Summation generator on 4 LFSRs
We fix n = 4 throughout this section and derive an algebraic equation of degree 4 that is satisfied by the summation generator. The variables of the final equation will consist of the LFSR output bits and the key stream bits but will not contain any carry bits.
Since we are dealing with 4 = 2 2 LFSRs, we have k = 2, and it suffices to use 2 bits in expressing the carry value. It is clear that the carry value should be symmetric with respect to the order of the LFSRs in use. Recalling Lemma 2, this implies that, when the current carry value c t is fixed, the carry bits c may be expressed as linear combinations of the elementary symmetric boolean functions S t i . In the general case when the current carry bits are not fixed, they will be linear combinations of the S t i with boolean functions of the carry bits c t 0 and c t 1 used as coefficients. For each value of c t and LFSR inputs possible, we explicitly calculated c t+1 0 and c t+1 1 . We then used Table 1 to expressed them using the elementary symmetric boolean functions. The result is given in Table 2 . Lemma 3. For a summation generator on 4 LFSRs, the following expresses the next stage carry bits as functions of the current LFSR output bits and current carry bits.
Proof. Using Table 2 , we may write
Simplification of these equations gives the claimed statements.
Lemma 4. For n = 4, the following expresses the carry bits of the summation generator as polynomials in the LFSR output bits and the key stream bits.
The first carry bit c t 0 is linear and the second carry bit c t 1 is of degree 2 in the LFSR output bits.
Proof. The first equation follows immediately from (1). It is a linear function on the variables x t j . Substituting this and its shift c t+1 0
into (5) gives
Now, since we are dealing with boolean functions, we have (S t 1 ) 2 = S t 1 and the second equation follows.
Finally, with this lemma, we may remove all occurrence of the carry bits from (6) to obtain the following proposition. 
=
It is of degree 4 in the output bits of the LFSRs and uses 3 consecutive key stream bits.
While simplifying the substitution of (7), (8), and shift of (8) into (6), we have used the equality S in terms of LFSR outputs x t j and current carry bits c t j . Since we shall be dealing with polynomials on different number of variables, we shall write S t j (n) to denote the elementary symmetric boolean function on n variables. As an example, we saw in the previous section that
Let us suppose that for some n = 2 k , the polynomials
Here, each coefficient f i,j is a boolean function defined on the current carry bits c t 0 , c t 1 , . . . , c t k−1 . For example, we see from (10) that
The following proposition will allow us to inductively calculate all F t+1 i (2 k ) for any i and k.
Proposition 2. Suppose equation (11) holds for some k. Then we have
The proof of this proposition may be found in the appendices. As an immediate application of this proposition to (9) and (10), we may write
Now, let us briefly recall the process we went through in Section 3 in obtaining the degree 4 equation of Proposition 1. We started out with three equations.
We used (18) to write c t 0 as a degree 1 equation that involves just the key stream bit and the LFSR outputs. This was substituted in the next equation (19) to write c t 1 as a degree 2 equation of the same kind. Finally, these expressions for c t 0 and c t 1 were substituted in the last equation to obtain the degree 4 equation that involves only key stream bits and LFSR output bits.
What would happen if we wanted to do the same for n = 2 3 . We would start with the following set of equations.
Notice that the first two equations here are identical to (18) and (19), as stated by (12) of Proposition 2. Hence, as before, c t 0 and c t 1 will be written as degree 1 and 2 polynomials. The main part of (23) is identical to (20), as stated by (13). They only differ in that c t 2 appears at the end of (23). Since (20) is of degree 4, equation (23) gives a degree 4 expression for c t 2 . Now, as given by (14), the right hand side of (24) may be broken into two big terms of degree (less than or equal to) 8. The first term is a degree 4 equation shifted by degree 4 and the second term is a product of two degree 4 equations. Finally, the left hand side of (24) is of degree 4. Hence, substitution of c t 0 , c t 1 and c t 2 into (24) gives a degree 8 polynomial connecting various LFSR output bits and key stream bits.
One can easily see that the above argument is general enough to be seen as the induction step needed in proving the following theorem. Theorem 1. Consider a summation generator on n = 2 k LFSRs. There exists an algebraic equation connecting LFSR output bits and k + 1 consecutive key stream bits in such a way that it is of degree 2 k in the LFSR output bits.
The general case
The following is an easy corollary to Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Consider a summation generator of n LFSRs. We shall let k = log 2 n . There exists an algebraic equation connecting LFSR output bits and k + 1 consecutive key stream bits in such a way that it is of degree less than or equal to 2 k in the LFSR output bits.
Proof. We may model a summation generator on n LFSRs as a summation generator on 2 k LFSRs with (2 k − n) of the LFSRs set to zero. Hence, our claim follows from Theorem 1.
For small n's, we explicitly calculated the algebraic equations. Table 3 compares the upper bounds on the degree of the algebraic equation claimed by various methods.
We believe this table is big enough to cover any practically usable summation generator and should serve as a good reference for anyone implementing a summation generator and considering its immunity to algebraic attacks. Table 3 . Degree bounds on algebraic equations for summation generators 6 Reducing the degree further for the n = 2 k case
For the case when n = 2 k , we may reduce the degree of the algebraic equation a little bit further, assuming that we have access to consecutive key stream bits. We will apply the attack described in [5] due to Courtois. Following the notation of [2, 5] , we classify multivariate equations that relate key bits k i and output bits z j into types given by their degrees of k i and z j . We say that a polynomial is of type k d z f if all of its monomial terms are of the form
Capital letters will be used in a similar manner to denote types of equations that may contain lower degree monomials also. For example,
In [5] , double-decker equations (DDE) of degree (d, e, f ) are defined to be any multivariate equation of type Proof. Let us, once more, recall the n = 2 2 case. The following is a very simple illustration of the process we went through in obtaining the degree 4 equation.
Let us next consider the n = 2 3 case also. Since changing the number of variables, i.e., replacing S t j (2 2 ) with S t j (2 3 ) does not change the degree of these equations, the degree 2 3 equation is obtained as follows.
(24), (30) ⇒
This shows that the general case may be proved by induction. To prove the induction step, it suffices to show that
gives a DDE of type K 2 k+1 ∪K 2 k+1 −1 Z 2 k . Checking the validity of this statement is trivial. And this completes the proof.
We may assume that all periods of the LFSRs used in the summation generator are relatively prime. Then the summation generator satisfies the requirement of the attack described in [5] , if we have access to consecutive key stream bits. The following steps may be taken to reduce the complexity of the algebraic attack.
1. Compute an algebraic equation explicitly using the formulae given in Proposition 2. 2. Write the resulting DDE in the following form.
Here, L t (k) is the sum of all monomials of type K d appearing in the equation and R t (k, z) is the sum of all other monomials of type K e Z f . 3. Fix an arbitrary nontrivial initial key k and compute the value L t (k ) for a sequence of length 2 m d . 4. Using the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm, find a linear relation α = (α t ) t such that
We note that steps 1,2,3,4 are independent of the initial key k, hence we can pre-compute the relation α. 5. We have obtained an algebraic equation of degree e. It is given by
6. Apply the general algebraic attack given in [6] to the above equation.
Example 1. The DDE for n = 2 2 is given as follows:
We take 4 LFSRs defined by the following characteristic polynomials.
15, 000, we compute 30,000 bits from the left hand side of the above equation for some arbitrary nontrivial key bits k . After applying the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm, we found that the sequence has a linear relation of length 3892 < Table 4 gives a simple comparison of the data and computational complexities needed for attacks on summation generators. Let w be the Gaussian elimination exponent. We shall use w = log 2 7, as given by the Strassen algorithm. Let the summation generator with 2 k input LFSRs use an m-bit initial key. We remark that for [8] and Theorem 3, the key stream needs to be consecutive. For [1, 4] and Theorem 1, the key stream need only be partially consecutive, i.e., we need groups of k + 1 consecutive bits, but these groups may be far apart from each other. Hence, a straightforward comparison of data complexity might not be fair. Also, the values for [8] have been calculated assuming that the LFSRs in use have been chosen well, so that their 2-adic span is maximal.
We have applied the general results of [1, 4] and [5] on stream ciphers with memories to the summation generator. Our results show that the degree of algebraic equation obtainable and the complexity of the attack applicable are much lower than given by the general results.
For a summation generator that uses n LFSRs, the algebraic equation relating the key stream bits and LFSR output bits can be made to be of degree less than or equal to 2 log 2 n , using log 2 n + 1 consecutive key stream bits. Under certain conditions, for the n = 2 k case, the effective degree may further be reduced by 1. And for small n's we have summarized the degrees of the explicit equations in Table 3 . The table should be taken into account by anyone using a summation generator.
